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V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Nathan David Neal appeals from the district court's appellate decision 
reversing the magistrate's order that granted Neal's motion to suppress evidence 
in his prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately midnight on November 14, 2012, Boise City Police 
Officer Ryan Thueson was travelling west on State Street when he observed 
Neal, who was driving a white pickup truck, "drive onto, but not across, the fog 
line near the intersection of State [Street] and Ellen's Ferry Drive." (R., p.101; 
Tr. 1, p.8, Ls.9-25, p.10, Ls.11-24, p.25, Ls.11-24, p.30, L.12 - p.31, L.23, p.33, 
Ls.16-18, p.37, Ls.18-20.) The officer "follow[ed] the truck and saw the right tires 
again drive on, but not across, a bike lane about one mile further on," near State 
Street and Gary Lane. (R., p.101; Tr., p.18, L.24 - p.19, L.6, p.31, L.20 - p.32, 
L.19, p.33, Ls.10-15, p.37, Ls.21-25.) The officer effectuated a traffic stop and, 
ultimately, arrested Neal for DUI. (R., p.101; Tr., p.20, Ls.20-24, p.33, L.24 -
p.34, L.5.) 
The state charged Neal with a second offense DUI. (R., pp.5, 28-29.) 
Neal moved to suppress the evidence against him, claiming the traffic stop -
based on what Neal initially characterized as a "single instance of fog line 
1 All citations herein to "Tr." are to the transcript of the suppression hearing 
conducted on February 19, 2013, before Magistrate Swain. That transcript is 
included as an exhibit in the appellate record. (R., p.237.) 
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touching" - "was not constitutionally permissible." (R., pp.11-12, 32-39; see also 
R., pp.85-90.) Following an evidentiary hearing at which both Neal and Officer 
Thueson testified (see generally Tr.), the state proffered three separate 
justifications for the stop: (1) Neal's acts of driving on the fog line and bicycle 
lane mark violated Idaho Code § 49-637, (2) Neal's act of driving on the bicycle 
lane marker violated Boise City Code§ 10-10-17, and (3) Neal's driving pattern 
supplied the officer with reasonable suspicion that Neal was driving under the 
influence of alcohol, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004 (R., pp.78-84). The 
magistrate rejected each of the state's proffered justifications and granted Neal's 
motion to suppress. (R., pp.101-03.) The state timely appealed to the district 
court, which reversed. (R., pp.149-51, 217-29.) Neal timely appealed from the 
district court's appellate decision. (R., pp.230-36.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Neal states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Whether the district court erred by holding that the fog line is 
not part of the lane. 
B. Whether the district court erred when, among other things, it 
interpreted Idaho Code § 49-637 to require near-perfect 
driving by motorists, despite the state's limiting language 
that driving need only be within a lane "as nearly as 
practicable." 
C. Whether the district court erred when it found, contrary to 
the magistrate's factual finding, that there existed sufficient 
evidence to prove that the relevant events occurred within 
Boise City limits. 
D. Whether, if the Boise City Code could apply, the district 
court erred by concluding that a violation of the code 
occurred. 
E. Whether the district court erred by holding that a law 
enforcement officer's mistake of law is sufficient to constitute 
reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation 
occurred, when the state never argued that the district court 
should so hold. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.2-3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Neal failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision 
reversing the magistrate's order suppressing evidence? 
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ARGUMENT 
Neal Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Appellate Decision 
Reversing The Magistrate's Order Suppressing Evidence 
A. Introduction 
The district court reversed the magistrate's order granting Neal's motion to 
suppress, ruling that Neal's acts of driving on a fog line and bicycle lane marker 
supplied the officer with reasonable suspicion that Neal had violated traffic laws. 
(R., pp.217-29.) Neal challenges the district court's decision, arguing as he did 
below that his conduct was neither unlawful nor sufficiently outside the normal 
range of driving behavior to give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying the traffic 
stop. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) Neal's arguments fail. Correct 
application of the law to the facts of this case supports the district court's 
conclusion that the stop was constitutionally reasonable. 
B. Standards Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)). 
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate 
court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
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The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
The Traffic Stop Was Justified By Reasonable Suspicion That Neal Had 
Violated Traffic Laws 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). 
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory 
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by 
an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 
P.3d at 1210. "An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being 
driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981 )). "Reasonable suspicion requires 
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the 
officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citation omitted). Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is 
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or 
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before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,203 P.3d at 1210; State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
In this case, it is undisputed that Officer Thueson stopped Neal because, 
within the span of approximately one mile, he observed Neal drive on top of a fog 
line and then on top of a white line demarcating a bicycle lane. (Tr., p.35, Ls.10-
23.) Reversing the magistrate, the district court concluded Neal's acts of "driving 
upon the flog line and upon the bike lane marker" supplied the officer with 
reasonable suspicion that Neal had violated Idaho Code § 49-637 ("Driving on 
Highways Laned for Traffic") and Boise City Code § 10-10-17 ("Operating 
Motorized Vehicles on Bike Lanes and Bike Paths"). (R., pp.222-26.) Contrary 
to Neal's assertions on appeal, correct application of the rules of statutory 
construction supports the district court's determination. 
1. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In 
Concluding That Neal's Acts Of Driving On Top Of Both A Fog Line 
And A Bicycle Lane Marker Violated I.C. § 49-637 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (201 O); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because the 
best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the 
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words. Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'I Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011 ); State 
v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The words of a statute 
'"must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not 
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construe it, but simply follows the law as written."' Verska, 151 Idaho at 893,265 
P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003)). "[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislature." kl (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun 
Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665,667,851 P.2d 961,963 (1993)). 
Idaho Code § 49-637 governs the operation of motor vehicles "on 
highways laned for traffic" and provides, in relevant part: 
Whenever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more 
clearly marked lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all else, 
shall apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely 
within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the 
driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with 
safety. 
I.C. § 49-637(1 ). Interpreting this statute, the district court concluded "the lane 
that the driver is required to stay in or maintain does not include the lane 
markings. A vehicle has not maintained its lane and is not in its lane, if it is on 
the lane markings." (R., pp.223-24.) Because it was undisputed that Neal drove 
on top of both a fog line and a bicycle lane marker, while driving on a highway 
that had been divided into two or more clearly marked traffic lanes, the district 
court concluded the officer had reasonable suspicion that Neal violated I.C. § 49-
637(1 ). 
Neal challenges the district court's ruling on two bases. First, he argues 
the court erred by holding a vehicle exits its lane by touching, but not crossing 
over, a fog line or bicycle lane marker. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-11.) Second, he 
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argues the court erred by interpreting the statute to require "near-perfect driving" 
when, according to Neal, the "as nearly as practicable" language of the statute 
"unambiguously permits minor driving imperfections." (Id., pp.11-17.) Neither of 
Neal's challenges withstand analysis under established rules of statutory 
interpretation and relevant case law. 
a. The District Court Correctly Concluded A Vehicle Exits Its 
Lane By Driving Upon A Fog Line And Bicycle Lane Marker 
The plain language of I.C. § 49-637(1) requires drivers travelling on 
highways divided into two or more clearly marked traffic lanes to drive their 
vehicles "as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." For purposes of 
I.C. § 49-637(1 ), the word "lane" means "that portion of the roadway for 
movement of a single line of vehicles." I.C. § 49-121(4). Neither of these 
statutes expressly indicate whether a painted lane marking - whether it be a 
centerline, a fog line, a bicycle lane marker, etc. - constitutes part of the traffic 
lane within which a vehicle must be driven. As found by the district court, 
however, the only reasonable interpretation of I.C. § 49-637(1) - and the only 
one that gives effect to both the prefatory language of the statute and the words 
"entirely within" in subsection (1) - is that painted lane markings are not 
themselves part of the lanes but are instead merely the markings by which the 
lanes of a highway are divided. Indeed, when used as a preposition (as it is in 
I.C. § 49-637(1 )), the word "within" ordinarily means "inside (a certain area or 
space)." See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/within. Because 
painted lane markings are what define the area or space that constitutes a lane, 
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such markings are necessarily not "within" the area or space of the lanes they 
mark or divide. It therefore follows that a driver who drives his or her vehicle on 
top of the painted lane markers is not driving "entirely within a single lane" and is 
therefore guilty of failing to maintain his or her lane in violation of I.C. § 49-
637(1 ). 
That painted lane markings are not part of the lanes they mark or divide, 
such that driving on them constitutes a violation of I.C. § 49-637(1), finds support 
in at least one Idaho case. See State v. Trottier, 155 Idaho 17, _, 304 P.3d 
292, 297-98 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding officer possessed reasonable suspicion to 
stop Trottier for violating I.C. § 49-637(1) where the evidence in the record 
showed that "at least a portion of Trottier's vehicle" "touch[ed] or cross[ed] over 
the dividing line of the lanes of travel"). In addition, a number of other 
jurisdictions that have interpreted statutes identical (or nearly identical) to I.C. § 
49-637(1 )2 also hold that painted lane markings are not part of the lanes they 
mark or divide. See,~, United States v. Bassols, 775 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1299-
1301 (D. N.M. 2011) ('"single lane' contemplated by the New Mexico legislature 
encompasses only that portion of the roadway that is between the lines or stripes 
that demarcate the 'single lane"'); State v. Vinson, 734 S.E.2d 182, 183-85 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 2012) (driver's act of crossing onto, but not over, double yellow lines 
2 The language of Idaho Code § 49-637(1) is nearly identical to that of § 11-
309(a) of the Uniform Vehicle Code. See United States v. Jones, 501 F.Supp.2d 
1284, 1292 n.10 (quoting, verbatim, Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-309(a) (2000)). 
Because the statute is derived from a uniform act, "a majority of the states in the 
United States have identical [or nearly identical] statutory provisions." United 
States v. Bassols, 775 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1299 n.3 (D. N.M. 2011) (and statutes 
cited therein). 
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separating opposing lanes of traffic violated plain language of statute that 
required him to maintain vehicle "entirely within a single lane"); State v. 
McBroom, 39 P.3d 226, 228 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) ("[TJhe phrase 'within a single 
lane' does not mean 'on' the lines that mark or divide the lanes. Rather, the 
statute requires that drivers stay 'within' the lines that mark the lanes."). The 
reasoning of Bassols is particularly instructive. 
After an officer witnessed Bassols drive "onto the solid stripe that 
separated the right lane of Interstate 40 from the shoulder" (i.e., the fog line), the 
officer stopped Basso ls for violating a New Mexico statute that, like I. C. § 49-
637( 1 ), states: '"[A] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely 
within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has 
first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety."' Bassols, 775 
F.Supp.2d at 1298. Bassols challenged the traffic stop arguing, inter a/ia, "that 
the statutory language 'single lane' includes the lane markers that separate lanes 
and a lane from shoulder and that a driver who is driving on a lane marker is still 
'entirely within a single lane."' kl at 1300. The federal district court rejected 
Bassols' proposed interpretation of the statute, reasoning: 
If a lane of traffic is defined to include the lane dividing lines, then 
there would be an overlap between each lane on a roadway and 
two vehicles could legally occupy the same physical space at the 
same time despite the fact that the vehicles would collide. . .. 
Further, given that the sides of most vehicles extend slightly 
beyond the outer edge of the tires, a vehicle that is driving with its 
tire on a lane marker even poses a risk to other vehicles that are 
not also driving on, but are close to, the lane marker. Thus, the 
only way to construe [the New Mexico statute] without reaching a 
result that permits two vehicles to occupy the same physical space 
is to conclude that the "single lane" contemplated by the New 
Mexico legislature encompasses only that portion of the roadway 
10 
that is between the lines or stripes that demarcate the "single lane." 
Because the lane ends at the point that the lane marker begins, a 
driver who drives on a lane marker has necessarily failed to drive 
entirely within a single lane. 
kt at 1300-01 (internal citation omitted). 
The reasoning of Bassols applies equally in this case. Like the statute at 
issue in Bassols, the plain language of I.C. § 49-637(1) requires drivers to 
maintain their vehicles "as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." If, 
as Neal suggests, the painted lines by which lanes of traffic are divided are 
themselves part of the lanes, the lanes would necessarily overlap such that two 
vehicles could occupy the dividing lines at the same time. It would also mean 
that certain parts of a vehicle, such as exterior wheel wells and side view mirrors, 
would extend beyond the painted lane markers into an adjacent lane. Such is 
not only inconsistent with the unambiguous directive that a "vehicle" be driven 
"entirely within" a single lane, it also creates an obvious safety concern and could 
not have been the legislature's intent In light of the plain language of the 
statute, and the obvious intent of the legislature in promoting roadway safety, the 
district court correctly concluded that "the lane that the driver is required to stay 
in or maintain does not include the lane markings." (R., p.224.) 
Without actually discussing the plain language of I.C. § 49-637, Neal 
argues there are several reasons why the district court misinterpreted it 
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-11.) First, he argues that, because he was driving on a 
fog line, not on a line dividing two lanes of traffic, his conduct did not pose a 
threat to the safety of any other person or vehicle and, therefore, was not 
prohibited by I.C. § 49-637(1 ). This argument fails for two reasons. 
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First, Neal did not just drive on top of a fog line; he also drove on top of a 
bicycle lane. (R., p.101.) Although there was no evidence that the bicycle lane 
was occupied by any cyclists at the time, it is clear that Neal's conduct had at 
least the potential to endanger other persons or vehicles with whom he was or 
may have been sharing the road. 
Second, and more importantly, the plain language of I.C. § 49-637(1) 
makes no distinction between center lines, dividing lines, fog lines, bicycle lanes, 
etc., in defining what a "lane" is. The statute merely provides that when there are 
"two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic," a vehicle must "be driven as 
nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." Just as a center line "clearly 
mark[s]" the inner boundary of a traffic lane, a fog line and/or bicycle lane "clearly 
mark[]" the outer boundary of a traffic lane. As such, a driver who maintains his 
or her vehicle on a fog line or bicycle lane is just as guilty of violating the "single 
lane" requirement of I.C. § 49-637(1) as one who maintains his or her vehicle on 
a center lane marker. See Bassols, 775 F.Supp.2d at 1301 ("If a lane does not 
include the center lane marker of a two lane highway or the lane marker dividing 
two traveling lanes going in the same direction, then it cannot include the lane 
marker between the lane and the shoulder."). And, contrary to Neal's assertions, 
the same safety concerns exist: "Just as a vehicle driving on the line between 
two lanes could collide with another vehicle driving on that same line, a vehicle 
driving on the strip between the lane and the shoulder could collide with a vehicle 
parked on the shoulder." kl Neal has failed to show any basis for distinguishing 
between a "fog line" and a center line for purposes of determining whether he 
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was driving his vehicle "entirely within a single lane" as contemplated by the 
statute. 
Neal next relies on State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 916 P.2d 1284 (Ct. 
App. 1996), for the proposition that "merely touching a line does not constitute 
exiting one's lane." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) Even a cursory review of Atkinson 
shows Neal's interpretation of it is incorrect. In that case, an officer conducted a 
traffic stop after observing Atkinson's vehicle weave back and forth in the 
roadway, twice touching the center lane marker and once touching the fog line. 
128 Idaho at 561, 916 p.2d at 1286. The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded the 
stop was justified by reasonable suspicion because, "[a]lthough Atkinson's 
vehicle never entirely left its lane of travel," the weaving pattern was an objective 
indication of impairment. J.5i. (emphasis added). Relying on the quoted 
language, Neal argues it is "clear that a lane line is a part of the driver's lane of 
travel." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) The quoted language says no such thing, 
however, and, in fact, implies exactly the opposite. If Atkinson's vehicle did not 
"entirely leave" its lane by touching the center line and fog line, it necessarily was 
not "entirely within" its lane when it did so either. Because the plain language of 
I.C. § 49-637(1) requires a vehicle to be driven "entirely within a single lane," 
driving the vehicle on the fog line or center line constitutes a violation of the 
statute. 
In a final attempt to show error in the district court's determination that a 
fog line and bicycle lane marker are not part of the lane within which a driver 
must maintain his or her vehicle, Neal points to a number of statutes that, he 
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contends, demonstrate such lines are part of the "roadway" and therefore 
intended for vehicular travel. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-11.) The state agrees, as a 
general proposition, that painted lane markings, like the lanes themselves, are 
usually part of the "roadway" on which both motorized and some non-motorized 
vehicles travel. Neal, however, was not stopped for leaving the "roadway." He 
was stopped for failing to maintain his "lane," in violation of I.C. § 49-637(1 ). 
Because the question in this case is whether a fog line and bicycle lane marker 
are part of a "lane," the statutes on which Neal relies to define "roadway" are 
irrelevant and in no way show error by the district court. 
b. The District Court Correctly Interpreted The "As Nearly As 
Practicable" Language Of I.C. § 49-637(1) As Requiring 
Motorists To Maintain Their Lanes Of Travel Unless 
Prevented By Objective Circumstances From Doing So 
In addition to challenging the district court's conclusion that a fog line and 
bicycle lane marker are not part of the lane a driver must maintain under I.C. § 
49-637(1 ), Neal also argues court erred in interpreting the statute "to require 
near-perfect driving." (Appellant's brief, pp.11-17.) According to Neal, the "as 
nearly as practicable" language of the statute "provides Idaho's drivers some 
flexibility" and permits them to stray from their lanes of travel onto painted lane 
markers, even when there is nothing objectively preventing them from driving 
entirely within their lanes. (Id.) This Court should reject Neal's proposed 
interpretation because it is not consistent with the plain language of the statute. 
Idaho Code§ 49-637(1) unambiguously requires a motorist travelling on a 
highway with two or more clearly marked lanes to drive his or her vehicle "as 
nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." There is no question that the 
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"as nearly as practicable" language modifies the requirement that a vehicle be 
driven "entirely within a single lane." Contrary to Neal's assertions, however, the 
statute does not give motorists the option of failing to maintain their lanes of 
travel when travelling within lane is possible. The word "practicable," though not 
defined in the statute, ordinarily means "capable of being put into practice or of 
being done or accomplished." See http://www.merriam-
webster. com/dictionary/practicable. According the word "practicable" this 
commonly understood meaning leads to the inescapable conclusion that 
motorists must abide by the requirement to drive "entirely within a single lane" 
unless something prevents them, or makes them incapable, of doing so. 
Relying on case law from other jurisdictions, Neal argues "it is not 
practicable for a driver to maintain a perfect driving pattern throughout his entire 
commute" and, as such, minor lane infractions - such as briefly driving on or 
across a fog line - do not violate the statute and, therefore do not provide any 
objectively reasonable basis for a traffic stop. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-17 (and 
cases cited therein).) The state recognizes there is a split of authority on this 
issue among the jurisdictions that have interpreted similar statutory language. 
However, the state submits that the better reasoned cases, and the ones that 
give effect to the plain language of the statutory language at issue, are those that 
reject a bright-line rule that "minor" lane breaches can never be a violation of the 
statute and hold instead that whether maintaining a vehicle "entirely within a 
single lane" is "practicable" is an objective inquiry that will necessarily vary 
depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. See, ~' United 
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States v. Bassols, 775 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1302-03 (D. N.M. 2011) (rejecting 
argument that single instance of crossing lane marker is insufficient as a matter 
of law to justify traffic stop for violating statutory provision nearly identical to I.C. 
§ 49-637(1)); United States v. Alvarado, 430 F.3d 1305, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(determining whether single instance of crossing traffic line violates an "as nearly 
as practicable" statute necessitates a "fact-specific inquiry into the particular 
circumstances present during the incident in question in order to determine 
whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a straight course at 
that time in that vehicle on that roadway"); State v. Wolfer, 780 N.W.2d 650, 652-
53 (N.D. 2010) Uoining jurisdictions that "focus on the reasonableness of an 
officer's suspicion in light of the facts surrounding the stop as they reflect the 
practicability of maintaining a single lane of traffic"); State v. Hett, 834 N.W.2d 
317, 320-23 (S.D. 2013) (same); State v. McBroom, 39 P.3d 226, 228-29 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2002) ("What is practicable or feasible will vary with the circumstances of 
each case."). Applying this objective inquiry to the facts of this case easily 
supports the district court's conclusion that the officer was justified in stopping 
Neal for failing to drive "as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane," in 
violation of I.C. § 49-637(1 ). 
The evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that, 
when Officer Thueson observed Neal, he was driving on a straight stretch of 
State Street, at or about midnight, with little or no other traffic. (Tr., p.8, L.9 -
p.9, L.24, p.13, Ls.12-20, p.30, L.12 - p.32, L.10, p.34, Ls.16-18; Defendant's 
Exhibits A-G.) Within the span of approximately one mile on that straight stretch 
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of otherwise largely unoccupied road, Neal drove on top of the fog line and then 
on top of a bicycle lane marker. (Tr., p.31, L.17 - p.32, L.24.) Neither Neal nor 
the officer testified that there was any obstacle in the road or other circumstance 
that would have prevented Neal from maintaining his vehicle "entirely within" his 
lane. (See generally Tr.) Given these facts, the officer was reasonably justified 
in stopping Neal for violating I.C. § 49-637(1 ). Neal has failed to show any basis 
for reversal of the district court's appellate decision. 
2. Alternatively, The District Court Correctly Concluded That Neal's 
Act Of Driving On Top Of A Bicycle Lane Marker Violated Boise 
City Code§ 10-10-17 
Before the magistrate, the state argued Neal's act of driving on top of the 
bicycle lane marker near the intersection of State Street and Gary Lane violated 
Boise City Code§ 10-10-17, which prohibits the operation of motorized vehicles 
on bicycle lanes and paths. (R., pp.80-82.) The magistrate rejected this 
argument, finding there was no evidence Neal's conduct occurred in Boise. (R., 
p.102.) The district court gave no deference to the magistrate's factual finding, 
concluding the testimony at the suppression hearing established the acts upon 
which the stop was based occurred in Boise. (R., pp.222-23, p.223 n.5.) The 
court also concluded the traffic stop was justified because Neal's act of driving 
on the bicycle lane marker violated the Boise City ordinance. (R., pp.222-23.) 
Neal argues on appeal that the district court erred by invading the fact-
finding province of the magistrate. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-20.) He also argues 
that even if the evidence supports a finding that his conduct occurred in Boise, 
the district court erred by finding a violation of Boise City Code § 10-10-17. 
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(Appellant's brief, pp.20-24.) For the reasons that follow, neither of Neal's 
arguments has merit. 
a. The District Court Acted Within Its Authority And Correctly, 
Albeit Implicitly, Concluded The Magistrate's Factual Finding 
- That There Was "No Evidence" Neal's Conduct Occurred 
In Boise - Was Clearly Erroneous 
It is well-settled that, in evaluating a ruling on a motion to suppress, an 
appellate court must defer to the factual findings of the trial court, unless those 
findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 
741 (2007). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record. State v. Trottier, 155 Idaho 
17, _, 304 P.3d 292, 298 (Ct. App. 2013). "Clearly erroneous factual findings 
are not entitled to [the appellate court's] deference." kl 
On appeal, Neal concedes the district court articulated the correct legal 
applicable to its review of the magistrate's factual findings. (Appellant's brief, 
p.19.) He argues, however, that the district court failed to correctly apply those 
legal standards and effectively substituted its view of the evidence for that of the 
magistrate's with respect to whether Neal's acts of driving on the fog line and 
bicycle lane marker occurred in Boise. (Id., pp.19-20.) The state agrees with 
Neal that the "district court afforded no deference" to the magistrate's finding that 
there was "no evidence" that the relevant driving conduct occurred in Boise. (Id., 
p.20.) Contrary to Neal's assertions, however, the district court was not required 
to defer to the magistrate's factual finding because a review of the record shows 
it was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
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At the suppression hearing, Neal specifically testified that he "lived in the 
city of Boise," "north of State Street, west of Gary Lane." (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-17.) He 
also testified that, on the evening Officer Thueson stopped him, he was driving 
his vehicle westbound on State Street, toward his home. (Tr., p.8, L.9 - p.9, 
L.16.) Neal testified he was "[v]ery familiar" with the route on State Street 
between Veteran's Parkway and Gary Lane because he "was born and raised in 
Boise, [and] grew up in that neighborhood." (Tr., p.9, Ls.20-24.) The remainder 
of Neal's direct-examination focused entirely on the road conditions on State 
Street between Ellen's Ferry and Gary Lane and on Neal's own perception of his 
driving conduct in the moments leading up to the stop. (See Tr., p.9, L.25 -
p.24, L.12.) When asked on cross-examination whether he was driving, on 
November 14, 2012, "[in] the city of Boise, Ada County ... Idaho," Neal admitted 
he was. (Tr., p.25, Ls.11-21.) Clearly, Neal's testimony established he was 
driving in Boise at all times relevant to the traffic stop. 
Officer Thueson's testimony likewise established the conduct for which he 
stopped Neal occurred in Boise. Officer Thueson testified that he is a patrol 
officer with the City of Boise Police Department, that he was on patrol on the 
evening of November 14, 2012, and that, when he observed Neal's vehicle, he 
was patrolling "the same area that [he had] worked [his) whole career" as a Boise 
City Police Officer: "the Ellens Ferry and State area." (Tr., p.29, Ls.3-15, p.30, 
L.12 - p.32, L.24.) Contrary to the magistrate's finding, this testimony - either 
alone or in combination with Neal's own testimony - was evidence showing, at 
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least inferentially, that the conduct that formed the basis for the traffic stop 
occurred in Boise. 
Because the evidence at the suppression hearing showed Neal's driving 
conduct occurred in Boise, the magistrate's factual finding that there was "no 
evidence" to that effect was clearly erroneous and not entitled to any deference 
by the district court. Neal has failed to show error either in the district court's 
application of the law or in its determination that the conduct at issue occurred in 
Boise. 
b. If Neal's Act Of Driving On The Bicycle Lane Marker Did Not 
Violate I. C. § 49-637(1 ), It Did Violate Boise City Code § 10-
10-17 
Boise City Code § 10-10-17 governs the operation of motorized vehicles 
on bike lanes and bike paths and provides, in relevant part: 
No person shall drive a motorized vehicle upon any officially 
marked bike lane, bike path, foot path or other separate right-of-
way specifically set aside for use by pedestrians or non-motorized 
vehicles except at an intersection or when entering or leaving a 
roadway at a driveway, private road or alley. Prior to crossing a 
non-motorized right-of-way, the motorist shall yield the right-of-way 
to any pedestrian or non-motorized vehicle operating thereon .... 
The district court interpreted this ordinance "to prohibit driving in the bike lane 
and on the bike lane marker" and, as such, held Neal's act of driving "upon the 
bike lane marker" constituted a violation of the ordinance. (R., pp.224-25.) 
Neal challenges the district court's ruling on several bases. First, he 
argues the ordinance "criminalizes the same conduct (leaving one's lane) that 
the Idaho Legislature has deemed a mere infraction" and, "[t]herefore, ... cannot 
be enforced." (Appellant's brief, pp.20-21 (emphasis in original) (citation 
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omitted).) Neal, however, did not raise this argument to either the magistrate or 
district court. (R., pp.11-12, 32-39, 184-202.) The issue is thus not properly 
before this Court on appeal. See State v. Bailey, 117 Idaho 941, 943, 792 P.2d 
966, 968 (Ct. App. 1990) ("It is well settled that an appellant may not raise issues 
before this Court that he has not raised and preserved before the district court in 
its capacity as an intermediate appellate court."). 
Next, Neal argues that if, as the state has consistently asserted, a bicycle 
lane marker is not part of the lane it marks, "then one cannot drive 'upon' a bike 
lane simply by touching the white paint [of the lane marker], because the white 
paint is not a part of the lane." (Appellant's brief, p.21.) Neal's argument in this 
regard is well-taken, but it ultimately does not afford him any relief from the 
district court's order reversing the magistrate's order of suppression. The lane 
marker either is or is not part of the lane. If it is not, then for the reasons set 
forth in Section C.1., supra, Neal's act of driving on top of the bicycle lane marker 
violated I.C. § 49-637(1). If, on the other hand, the lane marker is part of the 
lane, as Neal contends, then Neal's act of driving on top of the bicycle lane 
marker clearly violated the plain language of Boise City Code § 10-10-17 that 
prohibits the driving of "a motorized vehicle upon any officially marked bike lane." 
(Emphasis added). Either way, Neal's conduct supplied the officer with the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the traffic stop. 
Finally, Neal contends his act of driving on the bicycle lane marker did not 
violate Boise City Code § 10-10-17 because the lane breach occurred "at an 
intersection." (Appellant's brief, pp.21-22.) This assertion finds no support in the 
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record. Officer Thueson testified he observed Neal drive on the bicycle lane 
marker "just to the east of Gary Lane, ... where the Jack-in-the-Box is," and then 
"briefly return[] to his lane of travel before then taking a right-hand turn, 
northbound onto Gary Lane." (Tr., p.32, Ls.2-6, p.32, Ls.20-24.) When asked 
on cross-examination to clarify where the bicycle lane violation occurred, Officer 
Thueson testified: "It's just to the east of - of Gary Lane, right before the dashed 
lines indicating that you can enter into the turn lane to turn northbound on Gary 
Lane." (Tr., p.36, L.23 - p.37, L.4.) At best, this testimony establishes that Neal 
was near - not "at" - the intersection of Gary Lane and State Street when he 
breached the bicycle lane marker. Moreover, while the state acknowledges the 
existence of an "intersection" at State Street and the public entrance to Jack-in-
the-Box, see Boise City Code§ 10-01-01 (defining "intersection" and "highway"), 
neither the officer's testimony nor the photographic exhibits even hint that Neal 
was actually "at" - as opposed to merely "near" - that intersection when he drove 
on top of the "solid white line" indicating the bicycle lane. Neal's arguments to 
the contrary are without merit. 
Even if a bicycle lane marker is part of a lane such that driving on top of it 
does not violate l.C. § 49-637(1), Neal's act of driving on a bicycle lane marker at 
a point other than an intersection nevertheless supplied the officer with 
reasonable suspicion that Neal violated Boise City Code § 10-10-17. Neal has 
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failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court's appellate decision 
reversing the magistrate's order granting his motion to suppress. 3 
D. Even Assuming Neal Did Not Violate I.C. § 49-637(1) By Driving On Top 
Of A Fog Line And Bicycle Lane Marker, This Court Should Conclude The 
Officer's Mistaken Belief That He Did Was Objectively Reasonable And 
Did Not Invalidate The Stop 
As an alternative basis for reversing the magistrate's order granting Neal's 
motion to suppress, the district court ruled: "[E]ven if Officer Thuesen mistakenly 
believed that Mr. Neal violated the statute and ordinance by driving on the 
marker lines, this would not warrant suppression here, as his belief that this was 
a violation was reasonable." (R., p.227.) On appeal, Neal urges this Court to 
decline to consider the merits of this issue because neither he nor the state 
briefed or argued the "reasonable mistake of law" issue to either the magistrate 
or the district court. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-24.) The state acknowledges that, 
ordinarily, this Court will not review issues that were not raised to the district 
court sitting in its appellate capacity. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 
3 If this Court concludes Neal's conduct did not violate either I.C. § 49-637(1) or 
Boise City Code § 10-10-17, the district court's appellate decision should 
nevertheless be affirmed on the alternative basis that Neal's driving pattern 
supplied the officer with an objectively reasonable basis to stop Neal on 
suspicion of DUI. See, ~. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 
144, 149 (1999) (appellate court may affirm on correct legal theory). The officer 
stopped Neal at approximately midnight after observing him twice veer from his 
lane of travel and drive on top of a solid white fog line and a bicycle lane marker. 
(Tr., p.30, L.12 - p.32, L.24.) Considered in their totality, these facts provided 
the officer with an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Neal may be 
impaired. Compare Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286 ("Although 
Atkinson's vehicle never entirely left its lane of travel, this weaving pattern, with 
the vehicle three times touching the lines on edges of the lane, was not within 
the range of normal driving behavior and was an objective indication that the 
driver was impaired."). 
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10, 205 P.3d 650, 659 (2009). The state submits, however, that where, as here, 
the district court sua sponte rules on an issue not presented to the magistrate, 
the issue so ruled upon is properly before this Court. The district court's ruling 
was not an "advisory opinion," as suggested by Neal, but was rather an 
alternative basis for holding the traffic stop was constitutionally reasonable. 
Because the state had no duty below to articulate every legal theory applicable 
to Neal's suppression motion, see State v. Leichty, 152 Idaho 163, 169, 267 
P.3d 1278, 1284 (Ct. App. 2011), Neal is no more prejudiced by having to 
"respond" to the district court's "reasonable mistake of law" ruling than he would 
be had the magistrate decided the case on a legal theory never presented to it at 
the suppression hearing stage. The state therefore requests this Court to 
consider the district court's alternative ruling and hold, for the reasons that follow, 
that even if the officer was mistaken in his belief that Neal violated I.C. § 49-
637(1 ), the mistake was reasonable and did not invalidate the stop. 
Whether an officer's mistake of law will necessarily invalidate a traffic stop 
is an issue that has never been squarely addressed by Idaho's appellate courts.4 
See State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 246 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2010) (declining to 
address whether mistake of law invalidated traffic stop because "mistake at issue 
4 The state recognizes that in Burton v. State of Idaho Dep't of Transp., 149 
Idaho 746, 748-50, 240 P.3d 933, 935-37 (Ct. App. 2010), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that, because the statute upon which the officer effectuated the 
traffic stop could not be constitutionally applied to Burton, "no legal cause existed 
to effectuate" that stop. It does not appear, however, that Burton Court 
considered or decided whether an officer's mistake of law can ever be held to be 
reasonable such that a stop predicated on the mistake does not run afoul of 
either the United States or Idaho constitutions. 
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was primarily one of fact"); State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 175 P.3d 216 (Ct. App. 
2008) (where officer's alleged mistake of law did not cause Buell's detention, 
authorities addressing the viability of detentions based on mistakes of law were 
"inapposite"); State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 982 P.2d 954 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(finding it unnecessary to "resolve whether a police officer's mistake of law is 
unreasonable per se" because, even "allowing for reasonable mistakes of law by 
police," there was "nothing in the record from which it might be concluded that 
the officer's mistake was objectively reasonable"). As noted by the Idaho Court 
of Appeals in McCarthy, other courts that have considered the issue "are in 
conflict in their assessment of whether a mistake of law is unreasonable per se 
or is to be tested under the same reasonableness standard that applies to 
mistakes of fact." 133 Idaho at 125, 982 P.2d at 960, cited in Horton, 150 Idaho 
at 303, 246 P.3d at 676. It is true, as Neal points out, that many courts hold that 
a detention based on a mistake of law is always unreasonable. (See Appellant's 
brief, p.26 (and cases cited therein).) However, a growing number of courts hold 
that, so long as an officer's mistake of law is objectively reasonable, it can form 
the reasonable suspicion required to justify a traffic stop. See, ~' United 
States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005); State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 
(N.C. 2012); State v. Wright, 791 N.W.2d 791 (S.D. 2010); Moore v. State, 986 
So.2d 928, 935 (Miss. 2008); State v. Rheinlander, 649 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2007). 
While courts on both sides of the issue have articulated persuasive 
justifications for their holdings, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of North 
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Carolina in Heien is particularly compelling. In that case, an officer stopped 
Heien because the vehicle in which he was travelling did not have two properly 
functioning brake lights. Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 352. On appeal, the Heien Court 
assumed that the relevant statutory provisions required only one properly 
functioning brake light. lg_,_ at 354. Because the traffic stop was predicated 
solely on the officer's mistaken belief that the vehicle was being operated in 
violation of a statute that, in actuality, did not prohibit the conduct at issue, the 
question squarely before the Heien Court was whether the officer's mistake of 
law nonetheless gave rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct the 
routine traffic stop. lg_,_ 
In resolving this question, the Heien Court examined the conflicting views 
of the various federal and state courts that have addressed the issue. lg_,_ at 355-
56. The court acknowledged the justification for the majority rule - i.e., that, to 
be constitutionally permissible, "a stop must be objectively grounded in the actual 
governing law." lg_,_ at 356 (citing United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 
1271, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2003) (and cases cited therein)). The court ultimately 
found the justifications for the minority rule "more compelling," however, citing 
the Eighth Circuit's reasoning that allowing for objectively reasonable mistakes of 
law "is in keeping with the foundational principle that an officer's actions must be 
'objectively reasonable in the circumstances."' lg_,_ (citing Martin, 411 F.3d at 
1001 ). 
Expounding on the Eighth Circuit's rationale, the Heien Court proffered a 
number of convincing reasons why allowing for reasonable mistakes of law does 
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not offend the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, al! of which would apply equally under a state constitutional 
analysis. First, such a rule is entirely "consistent with the primary command of 
the Fourth Amendment - that law enforcement agents act reasonably." kl 
(citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)). Indeed, "[t]he 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001 ). A rule that prohibits an officer from making 
even objectively reasonable mistakes, "mandating that he be perfect, would 
impose a greater burden than that required under the Fourth Amendment." 
Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 356. 
Next, a rule that allows for objectively reasonable mistakes of law by 
officers, at least as to the interpretation of traffic laws, is also justified by the 
interests at stake during a traffic stop. As explained by the court in Heien: 
[B]ecause we are particularly concerned for maintaining safe 
roadways, we do not want to discourage our police officers from 
conducting stops for perceived traffic violations. A routine traffic 
stop, based on what an officer reasonably perceives to be a 
violation, is not a substantial interference with the detained 
individual and is a minimal invasion of privacy .... And particularly 
when judged against society's countervailing interest in keeping its 
roads safe, we think it prudent to endorse the reasonable 
interpretation of our traffic safety laws. 
kl at 357. The fact that a traffic stop need only be supported by reasonable 
suspicion and involves only a minimal intrusion on the privacy of the individual 
stopped is what differentiates this case from other cases in which the Idaho 
Supreme Court has declined to apply a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary 
rule under the Idaho Constitution. See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511,272 P.3d 
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483 (2012); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992). While 
providing citizens greater protections from warrantless searches of their person, 
homes, cars and other property may well be justified in light of the inherently 
invasive nature of such searches, the same concerns are not present when an 
officer, having an objectively reasonable (albeit mistaken) belief that a motorist 
has committed a traffic violation, briefly detains the motorist for the purpose of 
simply confirming or dispelling that suspicion. 
Holding that an officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law does not 
ipso facto render a traffic stop invalid also makes sense because, unlike 
attorneys, officers are not trained in the intricacies of the substantive law and, as 
such, cannot be expected "to interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and 
expertise of a criminal defense attorney." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 356 (quoting 
Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (internal quotations and citation omitted).) Again, the 
Heien Court's reasoning is instructive: 
[C]oncerns about the rules of construction regarding the 
substantive statutes at issue seem to us to be more applicable to 
the subsequent judicial interpretation of a statute and not to a 
routine traffic stop that needs to be based only on reasonable 
suspicion. A post hoc judicial interpretation of a substantive traffic 
law does not determine the reasonableness of a previous traffic 
stop within the meaning of the state and federal constitutions. 
Such a post hoc determination resolves whether the conduct that 
previously occurred is actually within the contours of the 
substantive statute. But that determination does not resolve 
whether the totality of the circumstances present at the time the 
conduct transpired supports a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that the statute was being violated. It is the latter inquiry that is the 
focus of a constitutionality determination, not the former. 
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kt at 357. Because law enforcement officers are charged with enforcing the law, 
not deciding its precise scope, allowing for objectively reasonable mistakes of 
law does not offend the Fourth Amendment. 
In fact, requiring "law enforcement officers to accurately forecast how a 
reviewing court will interpret the substantive law at issue" is actually "inconsistent 
with the rationale underlying the reasonable suspicion doctrine." kt Both the 
United States Supreme Court and Idaho's appellate courts have recognized that 
reasonable suspicion cannot be reduced to any precise legal formula, but must 
instead be based on commonsense judgments considering the totality of all of 
the circumstances known to the officer. £.JL, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
125 (2000); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,695 (1996); State v. Kessler, 
151 Idaho 653, 655, 262 P.3d 682, 684 (Ct. App. 2011). Preventing officers 
from reasonably interpreting the laws upon which they base traffic stops "would 
transform this 'commonsense, nontechnical conception' into something that 
requires much more than 'some minimal level of objective justification'"; instead 
of "merely requir[ing] that our officers be reasonable," it "would mandate that they 
be omniscient." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 357-58. In addition, treating an officer's 
reasonable mistake of law as dispositive of the reasonable suspicion inquiry 
would also "insert rigidity into" what is otherwise "a fluid concept" and would 
render unrecognizable "the traditional constitutional inquiry" that asks "whether a 
traffic stop is reasonable under a// the circumstances." kt at 358 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). Departing from traditional inquiries that guide 
whether a traffic stop is constitutionally permissible, based solely on an officer's 
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inability in the field to accurately predict how a reviewing court will ultimately 
interpret the law, seems neither wise no warranted where the officer's mistake of 
law is otherwise objectively reasonable. 
As a final justification for adopting a rule that allows for reasonable 
mistakes of law in the reasonable suspicion context, the Heien Court accurately 
observed that such an "approach allows reviewing court to treat all police 
mistakes the same." ~ Neither the Supreme Court nor Idaho's appellate courts 
"demand factual accuracy from our police when determining whether reasonable 
suspicion exists." ~ (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990)); 
see also Horton, 150 Idaho at 302-04, 246 P.3d at 675-77; McCarthy, 133 Idaho 
at 124-25, 982 P.2d at 959-60. And, as observed by the Heien Court, there 
simply is "no constitutional requirement to distinguish between mistakes of fact 
and mistakes of law in this context." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 358. This is 
especially true since determining whether a mistake is one of fact or one of law is 
not always easy. ~; accord McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 124-25, 982 P.2d 959-60. 
Indeed, in some instances, the two types of mistakes are "inextricably 
connected." McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 124, 982 P.2d at 959. Because the line 
between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact is not always easily ascertainable, 
the better rule, and the one that is consistent with the reasonableness 
requirements of both the federal and state constitutions, is that "so long as an 
officer's mistake is [objectively] reasonable, it may give rise to reasonable 
suspicion." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 358. 
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For all of the reasons set forth above, the state submits that this Court 
should hold that, so long as an officer's mistake of law is objectively reasonable, 
it can form the reasonable suspicion required to justify a traffic stop. Assuming 
this Court adopts such a rule, application of that rule to the facts of this case 
easily leads to the conclusion that the traffic stop was constitutionally 
permissible. 
As discussed in detail in Section C.1. of this brief, the plain and 
unambiguous language of I.C. § 49-637(1) requires motorists travelling to 
highways divided into two or more clearly marked lanes to drive their vehicles "as 
nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." Thus, the officer was not 
mistaken at all in his belief that Neal violated the relevant statutory provision 
when he drove on top of a fog line and bicycle lane marker. Even assuming, 
however, that this Court concludes the Neal's conduct did not violate the statute, 
the officer's mistaken belief that it did was clearly objectively reasonable. At 
worst the language of I.C. § 49-637(1) is ambiguous - i.e., "susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation." McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 125, 982 P.2d at 
960. Because, for the reasons set forth in Section C, supra, the requirement of 
I.C. § 49-637(1) that a motorist maintain his or her lane can, at the very least, be 
reasonably interpreted require a motorist to avoid driving on top of a fog line 
unless objective circumstances prevent it, the officer's mistaken belief that Neal 
violated the statute was objectively reasonable and did not invalidate the traffic 
stop. Compare McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 125, 982 P.2d at 960 (declining to find 
alleged mistake of law objectively reasonable where the operative law was not 
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"ambiguous or susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation."). Neal 
has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court's intermediate 
appellate decision that reversed the magistrate's order granting his motion to 
suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
appellate decision reversing the magistrate's order suppressing evidence and 
remanding this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of June 2014. 
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